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PHYSICIAN-SPONSORED MANAGED
CARE NETWORKS: TWO
SUGGESTIONS FOR ANTITRUST
REFORM
Jack R. Bierig*
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION is occurring across American medicine. This transformation is the result of an increasingly recognized need to manage the delivery of medical services
in the interests of both cost and quality. The transformation involves the emergence of large networks of physicians who hold
forth the prospect of managing the care of patients and of benefiting from economies of scale, profitting better than they would
in a series of small, atomistic practices acting independently of
one another.
These networks of physicians usually have been put together
by large insurance companies. For at least three reasons, however, physicians want to form their own networks to compete for
patients:
1. Physicians feel strongly that they can manage care in a
more patient-sensitive manner than insurance companies;
2. Physicians want to retain autonomy that comes with ownership; and,
3. Physicians believe that they can make more money by owning a network than by being employed by an insurance
company.
Despite the increasing tendency toward capitation and other
forms of prepayment, many physicians have concluded that they
can compete successfully on a discounted fee-for-service basis.
They are comfortable with this form of payment. Moreover, they
believe that by controlling utilization, by managing care, and by
reducing fees, they can offer a competitively viable plan that will
attract large numbers of patients.
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Significantly, when physicians come together to form a network to compete on a discounted fee-for-service basis, they immediately encounter two antitrust obstacles. First, they may not
agree upon a schedule of fees at which the network will price its
services. To do so in the absence of "risk-sharing" would be regarded as price fixing that is unlawful per se.' Risk-sharing generally is viewed by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies as
either (a) pricing on a capitated basis, or (b) being subject to
substantial withholds. 2 Investing capital that is at risk if the net3
work fails is not regarded as risk-sharing for these purposes.
Second, if the physician-sponsored network has more than
thirty percent of the practitioners in any specialty in a geographic
market, it falls outside a safety zone established by the federal
antitrust agencies and is, therefore, subject to antitrust investigation. 4 A network meeting the thirty percent limit will fall outside
the safety zone even if it is "non-exclusive," that is, individual
physicians participating in the network are free to - and do in
fact - join competing networks.5 By contrast, physician networks put together by insurance companies are under no similar
size constraints, even though such networks are likely to be far
better capitalized and far more likely to achieve power in a relevant market.
Antitrust enforcement policy forbids the setting of a fee
schedule by loosely integrated groups of physicians who seek to
compete on a discounted fee-for-service basis, and puts at risk
any such groups that include more than thirty percent of the
practitioners in any medical specialty. These two facts have combined to create an antitrust paradox in health care, that is the antitrust laws are supposed to promote competition. Instead, they
are suppressing competition by discouraging physicians from offering to patients and payors the alternative of a physiciansponsored network operating on a discounted fee-for-service
basis.
1. See U.S. Dep't of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm'n, STATEMENTS OF ENFORCEMENT
PO1CY AND ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES RELATING TO HEALTH CARE AND ANTRUST (SEPT. 27.

1994) [hereinafter 1994 AtnTRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES] 70.

2.
3.

Id. at 70.
Id.

4. Id.
5.

Id.
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The cure for this paradox is neither radical nor difficult.
With respect to the first issue, antitrust policy should recognize
that the development of fee schedules by physician-sponsored
networks may involve significant efficiencies and benefits for patients, even if the participating physicians do not share insurance
risks. Such fee schedules, therefore, should be analyzed under
the rule of reason rather than the per se rule. With respect to the
second issue, antitrust policy should treat physician-sponsored
and insurer-controlled networks alike in terms of the percentage
of local physicians who may participate without raising legal
risks. These changes will have the salutary effect of promoting
competition and consumer choice in the provision of physician
services.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Physician-Sponsored Networks
As used in this Article, the term "physician-sponsored network" refers to a joint venture in which physicians in different
locations and medical specialties come together to offer their services to managed care organizations (MCOs), large employers,
and other purchasers of health care without fully merging their
practices. Such collaboration increasingly is necessary to enable
physicians to compete for managed care contracts. The reason is
that large purchasers have little interest in steering patients to
traditional solo practitioners or to small groups. Rather, they are
looking for broad-based networks that can offer services across
the full geographic area in which employees and other covered
individuals reside, and across a full array of medical specialties.
In theory, physicians could fully integrate their practices in
order to produce a network that is attractive to large purchasers.
Complete mergers, however, involve significant transactional
costs. They also raise legal impediments such as the combining
of different pension plans. Moreover, complete mergers require a
degree of integration with which most physicians are uncomfortable and which is better achieved gradually rather than through
one major transaction. For these reasons, a partially integrated,
physician-sponsored network is the most practical alternative for
physicians desiring to compete for managed care contracts.
A physician-sponsored network may wish to offer its services to potential purchasers on a capitated basis, on a discounted fee-for-service basis, or use a combination of ap-
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proaches. Regardless of which payment mechanism is selected, a
physician-sponsored network must compete with other networks
offering physician services. If physician-sponsored networks offering services on a discounted fee-for-service basis do not control costs, they will be economically unattractive and will fail in
the marketplace. Therefore, such networks commonly engage in
credentialing, in utilization control, and in other processes designed to make them competitive.
B.

The Market For Physician Networks and Antitrust
Regulation of Such Networks

As noted above, physician-sponsored networks must compete with networks developed by large insurance companies.
Such networks routinely establish fee schedules that bind participants even though those physicians do not share risk among
themselves or with the insurer. These networks often include a
significant percentage of local physicians, sometimes as high as
seventy percent. Yet, unlike physician-sponsored networks, insurer-controlled networks may establish fee schedules without requiring participating physicians to share risk. Moreover, while
physician-sponsored networks run antitrust risks if they include
more than thirty percent of practicing local physicians in any
medical specialty, 6 insurer-sponsored networks face no restrictions on panel size.
The disparate treatment of physician-sponsored networks is
not mandated by the language of the antitrust statutes. Rather,
this disparate treatment is the result of enforcement policy. It
arises out of doctrines developed by federal enforcement agencies to guard against the possibility of anticompetitive conduct
by physicians who seek to offer a physician-sponsored fee-forservice alternative in the market for medical services.
These prophylactic doctrines were developed in an era when
physicians were viewed as likely to erect obstacles to the development of innovative forms of health care financing and delivery. That era has ended. Today, most geographic markets-at
least in urban areas-are dominated by sophisticated purchasers
and large delivery systems generally controlled by insurance
companies such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.
6.

Id. at 68-69.
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Physician-sponsored networks must be prepared to compete
on merits if they are to succeed in the market. They are in no
position to dictate terms to purchasers. In these circumstances, it
is both anticompetitive and unfair to require physician-sponsored
networks to comply with prophylactic rules that are not applied
to insurer-sponsored networks.
II.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Pricing Issues

1. The Problem
The first area in which current antitrust enforcement policy
requires reform relates to pricing mechanisms by physician-sponsored networks. Suppose that physicians who practice independently want to form a network to compete on a discounted feefor-service basis for contracts to perform services for MCOs and
self-insured employers. Suppose further that the physicians are
committed to intensive utilization control and quality assurance
efforts and that they are prepared to invest their money to fund
the operating costs of the venture.
In order to market the network effectively, the physicians
must establish a fee schedule to inform prospective purchasers
what they will be asked to pay if they contract with the network.
Indeed, establishing a fee schedule is precisely what an insurersponsored network must do when it markets its services. An insurer's establishment of a fee schedule is viewed as unilateral action outside the scope of section 1 of the Sherman Act7 and sec8
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Under current policy, however, the establishment of a fee
schedule by a physician-sponsored network would be condemned
as a per se violation of the antitrust laws. 9 The setting of a fee
schedule by the participating physicians would be deemed an
agreement on price among competitors. As such, it would be
prohibited without any economic analysis of the actual competitive effects of the venture-regardless of how procompetitive the
venture might be.
7.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

8.
9.

15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Socty, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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To avoid the application of the per se rule, the physician
network, but not the insurer-sponsored network, must become financially "integrated." In other words, the participating physicians must accept a substantial amount of risk. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) explicitly have recognized only two acceptable ways of taking on sufficient risk:
1. The physicians can agree to be paid on a capitated basis in
exchange for their agreement to provide a specified package of
medical services to a specified population; or
2. The physicians can agree to have a significant portion of
their payments held back in a withhold pool which may be recaptured if costs exceed projections. 10
Both of these alternatives involve the acceptance by the physicians of insurance risk.
The DOJ's and the FTC's reliance on the sharing of insurance risk represents an effort to distinguish between legitimate
joint ventures and naked price-fixing schemes. But the standards
applied by the agencies to physician-sponsored joint ventures are
far too rigid. A physician network that (a) enables physicians to
provide wide geographic and specialty coverage that no physician or group could provide individually and (b) that generates
significant efficiencies, such as utilization review and quality assurance, is not a naked price-fixing scheme. Such a network
should not be found to have engaged in per se illegal pricefixing when it establishes a schedule of fees in order to compete.
Rather, the network should be viewed as a legitimate joint venture competing in the market for network services.
The agencies' reliance on the bearing of financial risk as the
sole indicium of the legitimacy of a physician joint venture can
be traced back to the 1982 decision of the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society." But Maricopa, however, does not mandate the agencies' rigid insistence on the bear10. See 1994 ANrrrrausr ENFoRcEmENT GurIDEams, supra note 1, at 70.
11. At issue in Maricopa was a physician-sponsored Foundation formed to offer services to subscribers on a discounted fee-for-service basis. The Foundation, which included
70% of the practitioners in Maricopa County, established a fee schedule which set forth the
maximum price that a subscriber would have to pay for any given service. No patient or employer had to subscribe to the Foundation, and no physician had to participate. Nevertheless,
in a 4-3 decision with two Justices not participating, the Supreme Court condemned the fee
schedule as per se illegal price fixing. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals decision that was
reversed by the Supreme Court had been concurred in by Judge - now Justice - Anthony
Kennedy.
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ing of insurance risk. To the contrary, Maricopa specifically
recognizes that the per se rule does not apply to "partnerships or
other joint arrangements in which persons, who would otherwise
be competitors, pool their capital and share the risks of loss as
well as the opportunities for profit."' 12 Despite this language in
Maricopa, the DOJ and FTC agencies are unwilling to treat the
investment of capital as a form of risk-sharing, or to recognize
that integrative efficiencies may be generated without the sharing
of insurance risk.
This was not always the case. For a brief period during the
1980s, the Justice Department acknowledged that a physiciansponsored preferred provider organization could generate significant efficiencies through "integration that falls short of financial
participation and sharing of risks."' 13 The FTC, by contrast, consistently has required financial risk-sharing as a prerequisite to
the establishment or negotiation of fees by a physician network.
The joint policy statements adopted by the agencies in 1993 and
1994 appear to indicate that the FTC approach has carried the
14
day.
It is true that capitation and withholds give some assurance
that a network is generating efficiencies rather than operating as
a collective bargaining unit. But even without these forms of
risk-sharing, a network can offer a new and attractive product
that is easily distinguishable from a cartel. This is particularly
true where the network offers not only a package of medical services, but distinct network services, such as utilization review
and quality assurance, that themselves generate efficiencies attractive to purchasers.
Physician-sponsored networks appear to be the only type of
venture for which the DOJ and the FrC require financial risksharing as a prerequisite to examination under the rule of reason.
They are the only type of venture for which agencies refuse to

12. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356.
13. Charles F. Rule, Antitrust in the Health Care Field. Distinguishing Resistance from
Adaptation, Address Before the Antitrust and Health Care Seminar of the Antitrust Section of
the Connecticut Bar Association and the Connecticut Health Lawyers Association (Mar. 11,
1988), in Jom J. MILEs, 4 HEALT CARE & ArrrrrusT LAW, app. at E 11-7 (1992) (noting
that agreement to adhere to limitations on billing and treatment may generate integrative efficiencies without financial risk-sharing).
14. See 1994 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines, supra note 1; DEP'T OF Jusnca & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, STATEMENTS OF ANITRUST ENFORCEMENT POUCY IN THE HEALTH CARE AREA

(Sept. 15, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 ANnrusr ENFORCEMENT GuiaurNEs].
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view the contribution of capital and the sharing of opportunities
for profit and loss as legitimate forms of integration. The refusal
to acknowledge that the investment of capital is a legitimate
form of risk-sharing that warrants analysis under the rule of reason seems unjustified.
In any event, antitrust laws should not determine the particulars of how specific types of competitors should be paid. Further, antitrust policy should not preempt the business judgment
of purchasers who are willing to enter into fee-for-service arrangements with physician-sponsored networks. Unless a network
is packaged and priced in a manner that is appealing to purchasers, it will fail in the market. The important point is that the network ought to be given a fair chance to compete.
Of course, if participating physicians engage in a boycott or
other coercive negotiating tactics, the antitrust laws can be invoked, to prevent and punish this conduct, quite apart from any
doctrine of financial integration. However, absent such conduct,
antitrust policy should not be used to preempt competition. Let
the market, not antitrust enforcers, decide whether fee-forservice, physician-sponsored networks have something to offer to
purchasers.
To be sure, physician-sponsored networks that do not involve financial risk-sharing may utilize the so-called "messenger
model" to arrive at the price at which participating physicians
will provide services. 15 Invocation of the messenger model, however, simply highlights the divergent treatment of physiciansponsored and insurer-sponsored plans. Under the messenger
model, an intermediary shuttles back and forth between each purchaser and each physician in the network to arrive at separate fee
agreements for each physician.
When was the last time an insurer-sponsored network used
this approach to establish fees? It is doubtful whether any insurer
has ever used it. The messenger model is universally recognized
as inefficient and cumbersome, particularly given the thousands
of medical procedures and the large numbers of physicians involved in physician networks.
Physician-sponsored networks cannot be expected to be
competitive if they are exposed to severe antitrust sanctions for
15.

The "messenger model" is described in the 1994 ANTrrRusT ENFoRciFiENT GuiDE.

LUNES,supra note 1, at 94-96.
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engaging in precisely the same activities that their insurer-sponsored competitors find necessary for effective competition. It
must be emphasized that insurers routinely establish uniform fee
schedules applicable to scores, sometimes hundreds, of physicians. They regularly form contracting networks that do not involve capitation payments or risk-sharing among the participating
physicians. Presumably, insurers do these things in response to a
perceived market demand. Why, then, should an irrebuttable presumption of anticompetitiveness arise when physicians do the
very same thing?
2. The Proposed Reform
The reform that would cure the perversely anticompetitive
application of the antitrust laws described above is quite simple.
It involves no antitrust exemptions, nor does it require any cumbersome regulatory mechanisms. Instead, it consists simply of
analyzing the establishment of fee schedules by physician-sponsored networks under the rule of reason.
This approach would require antitrust enforcement agencies
and courts to take into account the purpose of the venture, the
nature of the market, and other relevant considerations bearing
on the competitive effects of establish of a fee schedule, such as,
the amount and purpose of any capital contribution at risk. If on
balance the establishment of the fee schedule was deemed anticompetitive, an antitrust violation would be found. Otherwise,
the physicians would be permitted to develop a fee schedule. A
judgment would be formed based on review of the facts rather
than on invocation of a presumption that is likely to be incorrect.
The rule of reason approach is precisely the one advocated
by the dissenting opinion in Maricopa and by Justice (then
Judge) Kennedy's concurring opinion in the court of appeals. As
Justice Powell wrote, for himself and for Chief Justices Burger
and Rehnquist, with respect to the physician-sponsored plan at
issue in Maricopa:
The fact that . . . [the] plan literally involves the setting of

ceiling prices among competing physicians does not, of itself,
justify condemning the plan as per se illegal. Only if it is clear
from the record that the agreement among physicians is "so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of [its effects] is
needed to establish [its] illegality" may a court properly make
a per se judgment. And, as our cases demonstrate, the per se
label should not be assigned without carefully considering sub-
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stantial benefits and procompetitive justifications. 16
Given the composition of the Supreme Court today, this approach would be virtually certain to command a majority, assuming that the Court were to address the issue now for the first
time. In fact, it probably would have commanded a majority in
1982 had Justices Blackmun and O'Connor participated.
Finally, the majority opinion in Maricopa essentially invited
congressional action to undo the application of the per se rule if
that approach were deemed inappropriate. Specifically, Justice
Stevens wrote: "The respondents' arguments against application
of the per se rule in this case ...

are better directed to the Leg-

islature. Congress may consider the exception that we are not
free to read into the statute." 17 It is time to accept Justice Stevens's invitation. Congress should enact legislation overturning
Maricopa to the extent to which that case requires a per se approach to the setting of fee schedules by physician-sponsored
networks whose participants do not bear insurance risk.
B.

Size Issues

1. The Problem
The second area in which current antitrust enforcement policy requires reform relates to the size of physician-sponsored networks. In examining the antitrust implications of such networks,
the DOJ and the FTC view the number of physicians in the provider panel as a key consideration. Their concern is that an
overly inclusive panel-one that includes a high percentage of
physicians in particular medical specialties-could create a barrier to entry by competing managed care networks. 8 In other
words, competing plans could have difficulty recruiting their own
panels if physician-sponsored networks were too large.
This concern is a legitimate one insofar as the network is
exclusive, that is, participating physicians do not offer their services through competing networks. Indeed, the combination of
16.

Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 363-64 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original; cita-

tions omitted).
17. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 354-55. In a footnote to this quotation, Justice Stevens
points out that Congress "can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all

cases .... "1
18. See, e.g., Letter from Mark J. Horoschak, Assistant Director, Federal Trade Commission, to J. Bert Morgan, Morgan, Miller & Blair (Nov. 17, 1993) (on file with Health
Matrx).
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exclusivity and a large panel ought to raise concerns whether the
network is physician-sponsored or not. 19 But the DOJ and the
FTC do not limit themselves to networks that impose some measure of exclusivity.
Non-exclusive physician-sponsored networks also are subject to antitrust challenge if they include too many physicians.
Specifically, the 1994 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines indicate
that a non-exclusive network in which the participating physicians share financial risk will qualify for a "safety zone" only if
the panel includes no more than thirty percent of the physicians
in any relevant specialty market.20 The 1994 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines place no limits on the size of insurer-sponsored
networks. However, they announce that physician-sponsored networks are at risk if they include more than thirty percent of local
physicians in any particular medical specialty.
To be sure, the thirty percent figure represents only a safety
zone. A physician-sponsored venture can include more than
thirty percent of local physicians in a specialty without necessarily violating the antitrust laws. In fact, the DOJ and the FTC
have approved ventures that include somewhat more than thirty
percent of local physicians in a particular specialty.
However, the fact that the thirty percent figure is only a
safety zone does not make this rule insignificant. Physicians tend
to be conservative. Moreover, the networks that they wish to
form have not built up substantial capital reserves. In these circumstances, the mere prospect of an antitrust investigation where
a network exceeds the thirty percent rule often is enough to dissuade physicians from including more than thirty percent of the
practitioners in a particular field of medicine in a network.
Further, the thirty percent rule also has symbolic significance. It bespeaks a government distrust of physician-sponsored
networks. The fact is that the 1994 Antitrust Enforcement Guide-

19. See Antitrust Analysis of Physician Network Joint Ventures: Physicians Payment
Review Commission 13 (Oct. 28, 1994) (prepared statement by Mark J. Horoschak, Assistant
Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission). (stating, "[take, for example,
an insurance company that entered into contracts with a substantial proportion of the doctors
practicing in a market, and those contracts obligated the doctors to contract exclusively with
that company. To the extent that entry by other provider networks might be precluded, we
would be just as concerned, and would use the same analysis, as if that conduct were engaged in by a physician-directed plan.").
20. 1994 ANrrrsT ENFORCEMENT GutEtasEs, supra note 1, at 69.
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lines make no mention of any antitrust risks that might arise
when an insurer-sponsored plan exceeds the thirty percent figure.
Thus, the thirty percent rule puts physician-sponsored plans
at an unwarranted competitive disadvantage. In many markets, a
network attempting to compete effectively must include substantially more than thirty percent of physicians in certain specialties,
particularly primary care specialties such as family practice, internal medicine, and obstetrics and gynecology. The reason is
that individuals often will select a particular network based on
whether their primary care physicians participate in that network.
A network that includes more than fifty percent of local primary
care physicians simply will be more attractive to more potential
subscribers than a network limited to thirty percent of such
physicians.
Significantly, the DOJ and the FTC have not explained why
differential treatment of physician-sponsored networks and insurer-sponsored networks is warranted. The thirty percent limit
appears to be based on a presumption that any physician-sponsored network is likely to be viewed as-de facto exclusive by its
participating physicians. For at least two reasons, however, this
presumption is unwarranted.
First, the enforcement agencies are quite capable of distinguishing truly non-exclusive networks from those that are exclusive in name only. Indeed, the 1994 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines set out specific criteria for making this distinction. 21
For example, the agencies look at whether there are viable competing plans in the market; whether providers in the network actually participate in other networks or contract individually with
health plans; and whether providers in the network earn substantial revenue outside the network. Examination of these and the
additional factors listed by the agencies ought to provide more
than adequate protection against the possibility that the participating physicians would treat a nominally non-exclusive network
as their exclusive vehicle for managed care contracting.
Second, there is no factual basis for assuming that physicians will discontinue their participation in insurer-sponsored networks once a physician-sponsored network is formed. Quite to
the contrary, many physicians prefer to participate in as many
managed care organizations as possible so that they may main21.

Id. at 69-70.
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tain relationships with existing patients and gain access to a large
pool of potential patients. In any event, the agencies' review of
physician networks ought to be based on the examination of specific facts, rather than on broad-based, and often erroneous, assumptions about physician behavior.
Networks that are truly non-exclusive simply do not create a
barrier to the formation of competing networks. Indeed, in many
communities, there are several competing networks that have
each signed up a majority of the physicians in the market. This
could not happen if panel size alone created a barrier to entry.
Moreover, physicians increasingly compete in a nationwide market for affiliation with major health care systems. 22 Payors who
are dissatisfied with the available selection of physicians often
are quite capable of recruiting new physicians to the community,
at least where non-primary care physicians are concerned.
2. The Proposed Reform
The DOJ and the FTC agencies should not be concerned
with panel size unless size is coupled with some degree of express or de facto exclusivity. In any event, however, there is no
justification for putting physician networks at a disadvantage by
requiring them to submit to size limitations that are not imposed
on insurer-sponsored networks. Insurers regularly put together
large panels of physicians in multiple specialties, capable of
serving the medical needs of a diverse and widely dispersed population. Again, physician-sponsored networks face restrictions on
panel size that insurer-sponsored networks do not. Unless the
DOJ and the FTC modify the size requirements for physician
networks, appropriate legislation should be enacted to address
this discrepency.
III. CONCLUSION
Reform is needed in the application of the antitrust laws to
physician-sponsored networks. Specifically, the following two reforms are needed:
1. Congress should enact legislation making the establishment of
fee schedules by physician-sponsored networks subject to analy-

22.

See Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Inc., 844 F.2d 473, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1988).

128
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sis under the rule of reason even where the physicians do not
bear insurance risk; and
2. The antitrust enforcement agencies should be encouraged to
treat all physician networks alike with respect to the percentage
of local physicians who participate. Failing that change in policy,
appropriate legislation should be enacted.

